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CHAPTER 1 
Contracts and Commercial Law 
JAMES STEVEN ROGERS* 
§1.1. Contraets-Termlnadon of At WID Employment Contraet-DIIm· 
qes. In 1977 the Supreme Judicial Court held in Fortune v. National Cash 
Register Co. 1 that an at will employment contract contained an implied 
obligation of good faith .and fair dealing such that the employer's bad faith 
termination of the employment contract was a breach for which the 
employee could recover damages. As one might have anticipated, the Mas-
sachusetts courts have been confronted with a variety of problems in deline-
ating the scope of the Fortune principle. During the Survey year, both the 
Supreme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts Appeals Court rendered 
decisions which provide some guidance concerning the reach of the Fortune 
case. 2 
In Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.' an insurance salesman 
brought suit against his employer and his supervisors seeking damages from 
the employer for the. termination of his employment, and from his super-
visors for intentional interference with his employment contract. Gram was 
employed in 1970 as an insurance salesman by Liberty Mutual under an at 
will employment arrangement. 4 His compensation consisted of percentage 
collllliissions on new sales and, at a lower rate, on renewals of policies previ-
ously sold.' In 1976, renewal commissions accounted for approximately 
one-fourth of his earnings.' Gram's work was generally satisfactory, 
although there had been several instances in which Gram.l!ad been repri-
manded for altering company mailings and using unauthorized sales litera-
ture.7 In early January, 1977, Gram sent to prospective customers a mailing 
• James Steven Rogers is an Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§ 1.1. • 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). The Court left open the possibility thatthere 
may be situations in which the obligation of good faith and fair dealing might not be implied. 
/d. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. 
• Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287,429 N.E.2d 21; Maddaloni v. 
Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv; Sh. 1357,422 N.E.2d 1379, review 
gnmt«/1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2083. 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, 429 N.E.2d 21. 
• /d. at 2288, 429 N .E.2d at 22. 
'.ld. at 2288, 429 N.E.2d at 22-23. 
• Id. at 2288, 429 N.E.2d at 23. 
7 /d. at 2289, 429 N.E.2d at 23. 
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which he had prepared. 8 Gram's supervisors obtained the approval of 
higher authorities at Liberty to fire Gram on the grounds that this mailing 
was unauthorized and violated company policies. 9 Gram brought suit and 
recovered verdicts in the amount of $100,000 against Liberty, and $40,000 
and $30,000 against his two supervisors. 10 Defendants' appeals were trans-
ferred to the Supreme Judicial Court on the Court's own motion. 11 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the 
Court concluded that the jury could have f.ound that the mailings did not 
violate any established company policy and that Gram was discharged 
without good cause. 12 Addressing Gram's action against his ~upervisors for 
tortious interference with his employment contract, the Court ruled that 
since the supervisors were acting within the scope of their duties to the 
employer, they could not be held liable for interference with Gram's 
employment contract unless they acted with actual malic~. 13 The Court 
ruled that the evidence at most could support an inference that the super-
visors did not want Gram to work under them, that they did )lot conduct an 
adequate investigation of the alleged violation of company J1olicy, and that 
there was no other valid cause for Gram's termination. 14 Such evidence and 
inferences, however, could not support a finding of a~tual malice. 15 
Accordingly, the judgments against the supervisors were reversed. 
Turning to Gram's action against his employer, the Court noted that 
under Fortune, Gram might recover for breach of his at will employment 
contract if the evidence would support a finding that the termination 
violated the employer's implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. 16 
The Court ruled, however, that the absence of good cause for terminating 
an employee does not, in itself, amount to a violation of th.e obligation of 
good faith and fair dealing. 17 The Court found no basis in the evidence for 
inferring that Gram was discharged for any illicit reason. 18 In particular, 
although the effect of the termination was to deprive Gram of the expecta-
tion of receiving renewal commissions in the future on polic~es sold by him 
in the past, the Court found no basis for inferring that the discharge was 
motivated by a desire to avoid paybig Gram the renewal commissions. 19 Ac-
' /d. at 2289-90, 429 N.E.2d at 23 . 
• /d. 
•• Id. at 2291, 429 N.E.2d at 24. 
II /d, 
" ld. at 2290, 429 N.E.2d at 24. 
" /d. at 2291, 429 N.E.2d at 24. 
•• ld. at 2293, 429 N.E.2d at 2S. 
" /d. 
16 /d. at 2294, 429 N.E,2d at 2S-26. 
11 /d. at 2295-96, 429 N.E.2d at 26. 
11 /d. at 2298-99, 429 N.E.2d at 27-28. 
" /d. at 2298, 429 N.E.2d at 27-28. 
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§ 1.1 CONTRACTS AND COMMERCIAL LAW 3 
cordingly, Gram was not entitled to recover full contract damages for 
breach of his employment contract. 
The Court noted, however, that Gram's loss of his expectation of receiv-
ing renewal commissions warranted special consideration. 20 The Court held 
that "the obligation of good faith and fair dealing imposed on an employer 
requires that the employer be liable for the loss of compensation that is so 
clearly related to an employee's past service, when the employee is dis-
charged without good cause." 21 Thus, the Court remanded the case for a 
determination of damages based upon the amount of renewal commissions 
which Gram reasonably could have expected to receive, reduced by some 
percentage to reflect the proportion of Gram's time which he would have 
had to spend in servicing the renewal policies in order to receive the renewal 
commissions. 22 
Justices Nolan and Lynch dissented from the Court's ruling concerning 
Gram's right to recover damages based upon expected renewal commis-
sions. 23 In the view of the dissenting Justices, the Court should not "impose 
a condition on parties to a contract which neither party had ever 
considered," at least in a case where the termination was not made in bad 
faith. 24 Furthermore, the dissenters charged that the measure of damages 
adopted by the majority would require the trier of fact to "engage in extrav-
agant speculation" concerning the variety of factors which might have led 
policy holders to fail to renew their policies. 25 
The possibility that a termination of an at will employment contract may 
lead to more extensive recovery by the employee than occurred in Gram is 
well illustrated by a case decided during the Survey year by the Appeals 
Court, Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc. 26 The employee, Mad-
daloni, was hired by the bus company as its general manager under a written 
employment contract which was terminable at will. 27 Maddaloni's employ-
ment contract provided that if he were successful in obtaining for the com-
pany authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission for interstate 
charter operations, he would receive a commission based upon revenues 
from such operations. 28 Between the time Maddaloni was hired and the time 
of his discharge, the sole shareholder of the company sold his stock to 
,. /d. at 2300, 429 N.E.2d at 29. 
ll !d. 
" !d. at 2301, 429 N.E.2d at 29. 
" !d. at 2302-03, 429 N.E.2d at 30. 
" !d. at 2303, 429 N.E.2d at 30. 
" /d. 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1357, 422 N.E.2d 1379, review granted 1981 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 2083. 
" /d. at 1357, 422 N.E.2d at 1380. 
" !d. at 1359 & n.3, 422 N.E.2d at 1381 & n.3. 
3
Rogers: Chapter 1: Contracts and Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1981
4 1981 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW § 1.1 
another. 2' The new owner approved Maddaloni's emplo~ent contract, 
and Maddaloni did in fact succeed in obtaining ICC approval for the new 
charter operations. 30 The new owner expressed considerable reluctance 
about paying Maddaloni his commissions, and, after the CQmmissions had 
been paid for three months, Maddaloni was discharged. 31 Maddaloni 
brought suit against his employer and recovered a judgment for a portion of 
the commissions he could have expected to receive. 32 The employer ap-
pealed the judgment finding liability and the employee cross-appealed on 
the issue of damages. 
The Appeals Court ruled that the jury properly could have found that 
Maddaloni was discharged in order to deprive him of the ¢ommissions to 
which he had become entitled and that such a finding would bring the case 
within the principles of the Fortune decision. 33 On the issue of damages, the 
court held that in cases in which an at will employee is discharged in bad 
faith, he is entitled to recover full damages computed on or~inary contract 
law principles. 34 Thus, Maddaloni would be entitled to judgment both for 
commissions and for lost wages. 35 The case was remanded for further pro-
ceedings to assess damages for loss of wages and fringe benefits as well as 
commissions. 36 
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in the Gram case represents a 
rather uneasy compromise on the difficult question of the extent to which 
employees should be protected against termination. In the l977 decision of 
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. 37 the Court held that an employer's 
termination of the employment contract of an at will employee was action-
able in a situation in which the evidence would support a finding that the 
employer terminated a salesman for the purpose of depriving him of com-
missions oa a sale made shortly before his termination. 31 Tlle Fortune deci-
sion has been widelf regarded as a major break from the traditional view 
that an at will employment contract can be terminated for good reason, bad 
reason, or no reason at all. 39 The Gram decision is both a limitation and an 
2
' /d. at 1360, 422 N.E.2d at 1381. 
•• Id. at 1360, 422 N.E.2d at 1382. 
" /d. at 1361, 422 N.E.2d at 1382. 
32 /d. at 1366-67, 422 N.E.2d at 1385. 
" /d. at 1362-63, 422 N.E.2d at 1382-83. 
•• Id. at 1370, 422 N.E.2d at 1387. 
" /d. at 1371, 422 N.E.2d at 1387 . 
.. /d. 
" 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). 
" /d. at 104-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. 
" See, e.g., Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employmeflt Relationship: An 
Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REv. 457, 471-73; Note, Protecting At Will Employees 
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 
1816, 1821, 1838-39 (1980). 
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expansion of the principles of Fortune. Gram makes it clear that the Court 
does not regard Fortune as establishing the rule that at will employment 
contracts can be terminated only for good cause. 40 In order for an employee 
to recover full contract damages for breach of an at will employment con-
tract, it will be necessary for the employee to demonstrate that he was ter-
minated for some affirmatively bad reason, not simply that the employer 
lacked good cause for the discharge. 41 On the other hand, the Gram Court's 
ruling that Gram could recover damages for the loss of expected renewal 
commissions merely upon a showing that the employer lacked good cause 
for the termination is a considerable expansion of the Fortune ruling. 
It is interesting to note that the relief sought by the employee in Fortune 
was precisely the same as the relief awarded in Gram-that is, recovery of 
commissions related to sales made by the employee prior to his termination. 
In Fortune such relief was awarded only upon a showing that the termina-
tion was motivated by a desire to deprive the employee of such commis-
sions.42 In Gram, however, the same relief was awarded even though the 
employee failed to demonstrate that the employer discharged him in order 
to deprive him of commissions. The difference between the cases seems to 
be that in Gram, but not in Fortune, the employee also sought damages for 
the loss of future earnings for future services. 43 The Gram decision may sug-
gest that had the employee in Fortune sought such recovery it would have 
been awarded, as was done by the Appeals Court in Madda/oni. 
The Gram decision indicates that the implied obligation of good faith and 
fair dealing imposes two separate requirements, breach of which result in 
different remedial consequences. 44 The good faith requirement prohibits 
only discharges based on some improper motive; 4 ' however, it appears that 
such a breach may lead to the award of full contract damages. The fair deal-
ing requirement, on the other hand, may be violated even without a showing 
of improper motive, although such a breach may result in a less extensive 
award of damages. 46 Thus, in Gram, the obligation of fair dealing required 
the employer to compensate the employee for ''the agreed worth of such an 
employee's past services" even though no violation of the obligation of 
good faith had been shown. 47 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2294-%, 429 N.E.2d at 26. 
" Id. at 2296-99, 429 N.E.2d at 26-28. 
" 373 Mass. at 104-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. 
" Compare Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, 2289, 429 N.E.2d 
21, 22, with Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass.%, 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1251 
(1977). 
" See 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2298, 2301, 429 N.E.2d at 27, 29. 
" Id. at 2296-2299 & 2296-97 n.6, 429 N.E.2d at 26-28 & 27 n.6. 
" !d. at 2300-01, 429 N.E.2d at 29. 
" Id. at 2301, 429 N.E.2d at 29. 
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The scope of the Gram fair dealing requirement is not clear. In addition 
to cases such as Gram and Fortune, involving an employee whose compen-
sation consists in part of commissions for past sales, the dram principle 
may be relevant to other forms of expected compensation fort past services. 
Gram may well prove to be a most useful precedent for employees who lose 
nonvested pension rights as a result of a termination of thei~ employment 
without good cause. The Gram court explicitly suggested tM possibility of 
recovery of nonvested pension rights in such cases by noting that "Gram 
has made no specific showing of his loss of any other ident~fiable, future 
benefit, such as pension rights, reflective of past services to. Liberty." •• 
Indeed, the possibility of the expansion of the Gram principle suggests 
that the Court may well have considerable difficulty in maintaining the dis-
tinction, upon which Gram rests, between the loss of future income for past 
services and the loss of future income for future services. An employee who 
has worked for his employer for a long time may, by virtue of his years of 
service, have acquired formal or informal seniority rights w}Jich made him 
eligible for higher paying jobs and increased fringe benefitsi such as vaca-
tions and the like. If the employee is discharged without good, cause, he may 
be forced to take a job with a new employer and begin anew m.s climb up the 
seniority ladder toward increased wages and benefits. The eJIIlployee might 
well argue that the higher level of wages and benefits which he would have 
received in his former job represented compensation for past 1services which 
are recoverable under Gram even in the absence of a showing of a bad faith 
discharge. Yet, recovery for such a loss of wages and benefits lis precisely the 
sort of relief which would be awarded under ordinary contract law princi-
ples for a full-scale breach of the employment contract, ~d Gram holds 
that such damages are not to be awarded merely upon a sho\\iing of the lack 
of good cause for the discharge. 
Thus, Gram appears to represent a rather unstable balan¢e between the 
employer's interest in freedom of action and the employee's, interest in the 
wide variety of benefits which he obtains from his employntent. In effect, 
the Court has ruled that the employer's interest in freedom of action must 
yield to the protection of those aspects of the employee's ihterest in con-
tinued employment which are specifically and directly related to his past 
services, but not to those of aspects of the employee's intdrest which are 
more nebulously related to his past service. Yei, the very poist which critics 
of the traditional rules concerning the termination of at wll employment 
contracts have been making for the past few decades is that!an employee's 
decision to remain with his employer for a substantial period of time repre-
sents a very real investment in the benefits which he expects to obtain in the 
future and that this investment ought to be protected against pnjustified dis-
•• Id. 
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charges. 49 Fortune an.d Gram are steps in the direction of full recognition of 
the employee's interest in the continuation of his employment. Having 
taken those steps, it will not be easy for the Court to stop short of the adop-
tion of the proposition that all aspects of the employee's investment in his 
job warrant protection against arbitrary discharges. Surely we have not seen 
the last word on this subject from the Massachusetts courts. 50 
§ 1.2. Contracts - Joint Obligation or Joint and Several Obligation -
Effect of Judgment for One Co-Obligor. In a decision rendered during the 
Survey year, Eastern Electrical Co. v. Taylor Woodrow Blitman Construc-
tion Corp., 1 the Appeals Court all but sounded the death knell for the dis-
tinction between joint obligations and joint and several obligations. 
Ironically, however, the case was one in which the distinction was probably 
irrelevant. 
The plaintiff, Eastern Electrical Company ("Eastern"), was the electrical 
subcontractor on a construction project. 2 The general contractor was an 
unincorporated joint venture named Taylor-South Company, created by a 
joint venture agreement between Taylor Woodrow Blitman Construction 
Corp. ("Taylor") and South Construction Co. ("South").l The subcon-
tract with Eastern was signed for Taylor-South Company by representatives 
of both Taylor and South. 4 
In 1974, Eastern brought an action against Taylor for amounts due under 
the subcontract. 5 South was joined as a co-defendant in 1975; however, in 
1976, Eastern's action was dismissed against South due to Eastern's failure 
to answer interrogatories asked by South. 6 Three years later, Eastern's mo-
tion to vacate the dismissal against South was denied. 7 Eastern then moved 
for summary judgment against Taylor. The trial judge granted Eastern~s 
motion for summary judgment, rejecting Taylor's contention that since 
Taylor and South were jointly liable, the earlier judgment for South 
precluded the entry of judgment against Taylor. • The Appeals Court af-
firmed. 
" See Glendon & Lev, supra note 39, at 475-83; Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual 
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 1404, 
1420 (1967); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335 (1974); cf. 
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733, 738 (1964). 
•• Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court has agreed to hear an appeal from the Appeals 
Court's ruling in Maddaloni. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2083. 
§ 1.2. ' 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 110, 414 N.E.2d 1023. 
' /d. at 110-11, 414 N.E.2d at 1024. 
' /d. 
• /d. at 111, 414 N.E.2d at 1024. 
' /d. 
6 /d. 
7 /d. 
• /d. at 111-12, 414 N.E.2d at 1024. 
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Justice Cutter's opinion in Eastern Electrical Co. began by considering 
whether the Uniform Partnership Act,' section 1S(b) of which provides that 
partners are jointly liable for most contractual claims against the partner-
ship, 10 must be applied to joint ventures. 11 Noting that Massachusetts law 
on joint ventures is not fully developed, the court ruled that the Uniform 
Partnership Act should not be considered as definitive on que$tions involv-
ing joint ventures, but may be applied by analogy when apptopriate. 12 In 
the present case, however, the court found, upon consideration of the joint 
venture agreement between Taylor and South, that their relationship was 
unlike the usual relationship between partners. 11 In particular, South was to 
some extent under common control with the owner and occupied a domi-
nant role over Taylor under the joint venture agreement. 14 Thus, the court 
concluded that partnership law principles should not be applied so as to 
render Taylor and South's liability on the subcontract with Eastern joint 
rather than joint and several. 1' 
The court then considered whether, as a matter of general contract law, 
there were grounds for finding that Taylor and South were jotntly and sev-
erally liable. 16 The court noted that there were several indicia in the subcon-
tract between Taylor-South and Eastern which might suggest that Taylor 
and South had incurred joint and several liability: the contract was in the 
form of "an agreement of a singular contractor but signed by plural obli-
gors;" 17 the contract did not explicitly state that only joint liability was 
incurred; 11 and the agreement stated that the joint venturers made the con-
tract "for themselves, their . . . successors and assigns." 19 Moreover, the 
court stated that support for the imposition of joint and several liability 
could be found in the fact that under the joint venture agreement between 
Taylor and South, Taylor was given primary responsibility: for relations 
' G.L. c. 108A. 
•• "All partners are liable: (a) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partner-
ship under sections thirteen [claims for loss or injury caused by partner's wrongful act or omis-
sion] and fourteen [claims for money or property of third parties misapplied by partners]. (b) 
Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership; but any partner 1may enter into a 
separate obligation to perform a partnership contract." G.L. c. 108A, § 15. 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 114-19, 414 N.E.2d at 1025-28. 
" /d. at 114-16, 414 N.E.2d at 1025-27. 
" /d. at 117-19, 414 N.E.2d at 1027-28. 
•• /d. at 111-12 n.2, 117-19, 414 N.E.2d at 1025 n.2, 1027-28. 
" Id. at 119, 414 N.E.2d at 1028. 
" Id. at 120-23, 414 N.E.2d at 1028-30. 
" /d. at 120, 414 N.E.2d at 1029. 
" Id. The court's suggestion that the failure explicitly to provide for only joint liability is 
some indication of intent to incur joint and several liability suggests a welcome reversal of the 
traditional rule presuming that multiple promisors of the same performance incur joint liabili-
ty. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 289(2) (1981). 
" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 120, 414 N.E.2d at 1029. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1981 [1981], Art. 4
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1981/iss1/4
§ 1.2 CONTRACTS AND COMMERCIAL LAW 9 
with subcontractors, and, whether or not Eastern had knowledge of this 
provision of the joint venture agreement, Eastern ''undoubtedly dealt 
primarily with Taylor, which was in charge of construction, and probably 
looked for payment primarily to Taylor which it sued first." 2° Further-
more, the court observed that the distinction between joint liability and 
joint and several liability has been subjected to trenchant criticism. 21 Justice 
Cutter noted that although the recently promulgated Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts does not go so far as to obliterate the distinction and make all 
joint obligations joint and several, it does recognize that the courts have 
often given effect to any manifestation of intention to incur joint and 
several liability that can be found. 22 
The court, however, expressly stated that it was not basing its decision 
either on rejection of the distinction between joint obligations and joint and 
several obligations, or on a finding that the joint venturers had in fact 
incurred joint and several liability, since so doing "might involve more 
sweeping rejection of long standing (but probably outworn) authorities than 
is now necessary." 23 Rather, Justice Cutter stated that these considerations 
at least suggested that "limits should be placed upon application of the old 
rule (assuming it should be applied at all) that at least a voluntary discharge 
or release of one joint obligor has the effect of releasing all joint 
obligors." 24 The court noted that it is well established that a judgment for 
one joint obligor based on certain defenses personal to him, such as dis-
charge in bankruptcy, does not preclude the entry of judgment against the 
other joint obligors. 25 The Appeals Court approved the trial judge's ruling 
that the default judgment of dismissal entered for South upon Eastern's 
failure to answer interrogatories should be considered a defense personal to 
South which should not bar Eastern's recovery against Taylor. 26 The court 
recognized that this ruling may be an extension of the authorities concern-
•• /d. at 122, 414 N.E.2d at 1030. 
" /d. at 120-21, 414 N.E.2d at 1029. 
" /d. at 121-22, 414 N.E.2d at 1029-30. 
" Id. at 123, 414 N.E.2d at 1030. 
" /d. Although the court referred to the rule that "a voluntary discharge or release" of one 
joint obligor releases all, id., presumably the rule which might be applicable to the present case 
is not the rule concerning releases, see RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs §§ 121-24 (1932), RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) oFCONTRACfS § 294 (1981), but the rules concerning the effect of judgment for 
one co-promisor on the liability of the other co-promisors, see RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACfS §§ 
118-19 (1932), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACI'S §§ 291, 292 (1981). The opinion 
manifests some confusion on this point, as in the suggestion that the fact that the judgment of 
dismissal for South was not voluntary or intentional warrants the conclusion that the dismissal 
of South should have no effect on Eastern's action against Taylor. See 1981 Mass. App. Ct. 
Adv. Sh. at 124, 414 N.E.2d at 1031. 
" /d. at 113 & n.2, 123, 414 N.E.2d at 1025 & n.2, 1030. 
" /d. at 123, 414 N.E.2d at 1030. 
9
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ing such personal defenses, but felt that this was appropriate in the present 
case to avoid unjust consequences of the procedural dismissal of Eastern's 
claim against South. 27 Accordingly, the entry of summary judgment against 
Taylor for the amount remaining due to Eastern under the subcontract with 
Taylor-South was affirmed. 
The terms "joint" and "several" as applied to contractual obligations 
are quite ambiguous. 28 Such language is sometimes used in describing the 
distinction between situations in which a number of persons promise to 
render different performances and situations in which a number of persons 
promise to render the same performance. 29 While the terms "joint" and 
"several" may do little more than engender confusion, this distinction in-
volves a genuine issue of contractual interpretation. For example, in Gold-
stein v. Katz30 two partners promised their employee a $1000 bonus if he 
undertook certain additional duties. The dispute was whether there was a 
single performance, payment of $1000, which had been promised by the two 
partners, or whether the partners had promised separate performances, that 
is, each would pay the employee $500. Such questions entail unavoidable 
problems of contractual interpretation which arise out of the complexities 
of human affairs and must be resolved by the ordinary process of seeking 
the intentions of the parties. 3 ' In the Eastern Electrical Co. case, however, 
there was no dispute on this score. No one suggested that Taylor and South 
had each engaged separately to pay Eastern only a portion of the total 
amount due under the subcontract. Rather, it was clear from the arrange-
ments between the parties that a single performance, payment of the agreed 
price for the subcontract work, had been promised by two parties, Taylor 
and South. 
The issue discussed in Eastern Electrical Co. - distinguishing between 
joint obligations and joint and several obligations - is a problem which 
arises not out of the inevitable complexity of human affairs but out of the 
unnecessary complexity of legal categories. It should be borne in mind that 
both "joint obligation" and "joint and several obligation" are subcate-
gories of the category of promises of a single performance by multiple 
promisors, and that the distinction between these two concepts has nothing 
to do with the basic nature of the undertakings of the parties. 32 Whether an 
" /d. at 124-2S, 414 N.E.2d at 1031. 
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS Introductory Note to Chapter 13, at 402 (1981); 4 
CORBIN ON CoNTRAcrs § 92S, at 702 (19S1). 
29 See generally 4 CoRBIN ON CoNTRAcrs §§ 92S-26. 
" 32S Mass. 428, 91 N.E.2d 237 (19SO). 
" See id.; Lovell v. Commonwealth Thread Co., 272 Mass. 138, 172 N.E. 77 (1930); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 288 (1981); 4 CoRBIN ON CONTRACfS § 926 (1951). 
32 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 288, Comment b (1981); 4 CORBIN ON CON· 
TRAcrs § 92S, at 701..{)2 (19S1). 
There is, of course, a third possible subcategory of multiple promises of one performance, 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1981 [1981], Art. 4
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1981/iss1/4
§ 1.2 CONTRACfS AND COMMERCIAL LAW 11 
obligation is classified as joint or as joint and several, the promisee can, if 
he successfully avoids various procedural traps, obtain damages from any 
or all of the promisors for the full amount promised, although he is, of 
course, limited to a single satisfaction;33 and if one of the promisors is 
forced to pay more than his pro rata, or otherwise agreed, share of the total 
liability, he can recover contribution from the others. 34 
The distinction between joint and joint and several obligations involves 
only what Professor Corbin aptly terms certain "analytical and procedural 
excresences." 35 In the absence of statutory or judicial reform, the principal 
common law differences between joint and joint and several obligations 
were as follows: Obligors of a joint obligation must all be joined as defend-
ants in an action on the obligation, while obligors of a joint and several 
obligation could be sued separately. 36 In an action on a joint obligation, the 
judgment must be for or against all of the obligors, while in an action on a 
joint and several obligation judgment might be entered for some and 
against others. 37 In an action on a joint obligation, but not a joint and 
several obligation, a judgment entered against one of the promisors would 
preclude the promisee from later proceeding against the other promisors, 
even though the first judgment was unsatisfied. 38 In the case of joint obliga-
tions, but not joint and several obligations, an action against the estate of a 
deceased joint promisor was barred while co-promisors survived. 39 Finally, 
in some, but not all, jurisdictions, the rule that a release of one promisor 
barred an action against the other co-promisors was applied only to joint 
obligations. 40 
that is, several obligations. Parties might incur several liability by expressly so providing or by 
promising the same performance in separate documents. See 4 CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 925, at 
700-01 (1951). Disputes concerning several, but not joint and several, obligations do not seem 
to appear frequently in the decisions since as there is little, if any, difference of significance in 
the distinction between several obligations and joint and several obligations. See G.L. c. 231 § 
4 and MAss. R. C1v. P. 20 (permitting joinder of several obligors). 
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 289(1) (1981); 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 928 
(1951). 
34 Quintin v. Magnant, 285 Mass. 450, 189 N.E. 209 (1934); 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 924, 
at 698-99 (1951); id. § 929, at 702-03. 
" 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 925, at 701-02 (1951). 
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 13, at 402 (1981); 
id. § 290, Comment a; 4 CoRBIN ON CoNTRACTS§ 929, at 717-19 (1951); id. § 937, at 774. 
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 13, at 402 (1981); 
id. § 291, Comment a. 
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 13, at 402 (1981); 
id. § 292, Comment a; 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 929, at 720-21 (1951); id. § 937, at 774. 
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 13, at 402-03 
(1981); id. § 296, Comment a; 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 930 (1951). 
•• REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 13, at 403 (1981); 
id. § 294, Comments a and C (1981); 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§§ 931-34 (1951); id. § 937, at 
777-79. 
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In Massachusetts, as in other jurisdictions, many of the distinctions have 
been superseded by legislative or judicial reform, 41 although Massachusetts 
has not, thus far, gone as far as the many jurisdictions which have adopted 
statutes converting all joint· obligations into joint and several obligations. u 
The Appeals Court's opinion in Eastern Electrical Co. suggests that the 
court may well abrogate the distinction by judicial decision if presented with 
a case in which no other method of avoiding the unjust consequences of the 
joint obligation rules is available. 
Until the time that the joint obligation rules are finally Utid to rest, it 
seems likely, as the Eastern Electrical Co. opinion indicates, that the court 
will be quite willing, under the guise of contractual interpretation, to avoid 
the effects of the joint obligation rules by construing agreements to create 
Massachusetts is one of the states in which the rule that discharge of one co-obligor 
discharges all has been applied both to joint obligations and to joint and several obligations. 
E.g., Wiggin v. Tudor, 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 434, 444 (1839); American Bank v. Doolittle, 31 
Mass. (14 Pick.) 123 (1833). In his discussion in Eastern Electrical Co. of ~he desirability of 
abolishing the distinction between joint obligations and joint and several obligations, Justice 
Cutter states that, "the distinction all too frequently may result in serious unfairness because 
of the rule that the voluntary discharge or release of one joint obligor discharges other joint 
obligors." 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 121,414 N.E.2d at 1029. In a jurisdiction such as 
Massachusetts, however, the problems concerning the rules on release of one co-obligor have 
nothing to do with the distinction between joint obligations and joint and several obligations. 
See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 13, at 403 (1981); 
id. § 294, Comment c (1981). 
•• Concerning the requirement of joinder of all joint obligors, Massachusetts long ago 
adopted the rule that non-joinder could be raised only by a plea in abatement wherein the 
defendant "gave the plaintiff a better writ" by naming the other joint obligors so that plaintiff 
might join them in a new.suit. Wilson v. Nevers, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 20 (1838~. Moreover, non-
joinder of a joint obligor who cannot be served with process due to his absence from the state 
or other good cause does not prevent continuation of the suit against the remaining co-
obligors. G.L. c. 227, § 14. To the extent that anything remains of the joinder rule, the flexible 
language of MAss. R. C1v. P. 19 should prevent it from doing any serious harm. 
The rule requiring that judgment be either for or against all joint obligors is subject to the ex-
ception for certain defenses personal to one of the co-obligors, MacKintosh v. Chambers, 285 
Mass. 594, 190 N.E. 38 (1934), and a somewhat limited statutory modification, G.L. c. 235, § 
6. Any remaining fragment of the related rule requiring that a plaintiff, whose complaint 
named as joint obligor defendants more parties than he actually proved to be joint obligors be 
non-suited, see Tuttle v. Cooper, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 281 (1830), should have been eliminated 
by modern rules on amendment of pleadings, MASs. R. CJv. P. 15. 
The rule that a judgment entered in a suit against fewer than all of the joint obligors 
discharges the other joint obligors may still be the law in Massachusetts, see l.onnqvist v. Lam-
mi, 242 Mass. 574, 577, 136 N.E. 610,612 (1922); Cowley v. Patch, 120 Mass. 137, 138 (1876); 
Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass. 148 (1816), except to the extent modified by G.L. c. 227, § 14, per-
mitting subsequent suits against joint obligors who could not be served with process in the first 
suit. 
The rule of barring actions against the estate of a joint obligor has been abolished altogether 
by statute. G.L. c. 197, § 8. 
42 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 13, at 403-06. 
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joint and several liability. Although the Appeals Court did not ultimately 
rest its decision on this ground, the court did, as has been noted above, sug-
gest that there were various aspects of the relationship between Eastern and 
Taylor-South which might warrant a finding that joint and several liability 
was intended. 43 This seems to be a somewhat disingenuous approach. The 
new Restatement (Second) of Contracts, deferring to the existing state of 
decisional law, continues to adhere to the rule that when multiple obligors 
promise the same performance it is presumed that they incur only joint 
liability unless they manifest an intention to create several or joint and 
several liability. 44 The comment to this section, however, thoroughly under-
cuts the rationale both for the rule presuming joint liability and for the no-
tion that the parties' intention provides the key to determining whether joint 
or joint and several liability was incurred. The comment notes that "[w]here 
a 'joint' duty differs from 'joint and several' 4uties, the joint duty is in-
variably less advantageous to the promisee, while the advantage to the 
promisor does not normally serve any legitimate interest. " 4 ' Given that 
fact, and given the exceedingly quirky nature of the differences, it seems 
highly unlikely that parties actually will bargain for only joint liability, if, 
indeed, it is plausible to suppose that parties really think about the distinc-
tion at all. 46 
The Appeals Court's discussion of the possibility of abrogating the 
distinction between joint and joint and several liability, or finding that 
Taylor and South had incurred joint and several liability assumes that if the 
rules governing joint and several obligations were applied it would follow 
that the dismissal of Eastern's complaint against South would not affect 
Eastern's claim against Taylor}' This assumption, however, appears to be 
unfounded. Indeed, in the situation involved in the Eastern Electrical Co. 
case, it may make no difference whether Taylor and South's liability is con-
sidered to be joint or joint and several. 
As the court recognized in its ultimate disposition of the case, the rule 
that judgments in actions on joint obligations must be for or against all 
obligors alike is subject to a number of exceptions. 41 A judgment in favor of 
•• 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 120, 122, 414 N.E.2d at 1029, 1030. 
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 289(2) (1981). 
•• /d. Comment b. 
•• Moreover, indicia of "separateness" such as the facts pointed to by the Appeals Court in 
Eastern Electrical Co. that Eastern probably dealt with and looked for payment primarily to 
Taylor, 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 122, 414 N.E.2d at 1030, seem to have little to do 
with the technical, procedural differences between joint obligations and joint and several 
obligations. 
47 /d. at 122-23, 414 N.E.2d at 1030 ("Either of these grounds of action [abolition of the 
distinction or finding joint and several liability] would achieve the equitable purpose of assur-
ing that Eastern receive payment for work which it has fully performed.") 
•• See id. at 113 & n.2, 123, 414 N.E.2d at 1025 & n.2, 1030. 
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one joint obligor will not preclude judgment against other obligors in cases 
in which the obligor who prevailed did so on the basis of certain defenses 
personal to him, such as discharge in bankruptcy, statute of limitations, 
lack of personal jurisdiction, or contractual incapacity. 49 On the other 
hand, a judgment for one joint obligor on the basis of a ruling on the merits 
that the obligee is not entitled to recover would preclude judgment for the 
obligee against the other obligors. 50 Thus, if Taylor and South were jointly 
liable, the effect of the dismissal of Eastern's claim against South on its 
claim against Taylor would depend on the characterization of South's 
defense. 
The Appeals Court seems to have assumed that if Taylor and South were 
jointly and severally liable, it would follow, without more, that South's 
dismissal could have no effect on Eastern's claim against Taylor. 51 It is 
clearly not the case, however, that the fact that promisors are jointly and 
severally liable means that a judgment for one co-promisor can have no ef-
fect on the liability of the others. 52 As the new Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts indicates, the rules concerning the effect of a judgment for one 
co-promisor on the liability of the others are the same no matter how the 
promisor's liability is categorized. Section 291 states that ''[i]n an action 
against promisors of the same performance, whether their duties are joint, 
several, or joint and several, judgment can properly be entered for or 
against one even though no judgment or a different judgment is entered 
with respect to another, except that judgment for one and against another is 
improper where there has been a determination on the merits and the liabili-
ty of one cannot exist without the liability ofthe other." 53 Similarly, section 
292 states that "the effect of judgment for one or more promisors of the 
same performance is determined by the rules of res judicata relating to 
suretyship or vicarious liability." 54 
Thus, all of the Appeals Court's discussion of the distinction between 
joint obligations and joint and several obligations seems to have been en-
tirely beside the point. Under either characterization, the question is the ex-
tent to which principles of fairness, consistency, and res judicata dictate 
•• Riley v. Burns, 304 Mass. IS, 17, 22 N.E.2d 761, 762 (1939); MacKintosh v. Chambers, 
28S Mass. S94, S98-99, 190 N.E. 38, 40 (1934); Hathaway v. Crocker, 48'Mass. (7 Met.) 262 
(1843); Tuttle v. Cooper, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 281 (1830). 
•• Riley v. Burns, 304 Mass. IS, 22 N.E.2d 761 (1939); MacKintosh v. Chambers, 28S Mass. 
S94, 190 N.E. 38 (1934); Mulrey v. Carberry, 204 Mass. 378, 381, 90 N.E. S76, S77 (1910). 
" See 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 122-23, 414 N.E.2d at 1030. 
52 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sartorious, 130 Mo. App. 23, 108 S.W. 1089' (1908); Spencer v. 
Dearth, 43 Vt. 98 (1870); Townsend v. Riddle, 2 N.H. 448 (1822). 
" REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 291 (1981). 
54 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS§ 292(2) (1981). 
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that the dismissal of Eastern's action against South should affect Eastern's 
action against Taylor. ss 
In considering the effect of a judgment for one co-obligor on the liability 
of the remaining co-obligors, it is important to consider both the rights of 
the obligee against the co-obligors and the rights of the co-obligors among 
themselves. As Professor Corbin has pointed out, the law of suretyship is 
necessarily involved in any situation in which two or more persons have 
promised the same performance. 56 Co-obligors, whether their liability is 
joint, several, or joint and several, can be considered as principal debtors to 
the extent of their pro rata portion of the total debt, or whatever other por-
tion they have among themselves agreed to bear, and as sureties of the per-
formance of their co-obligors for the remainder of the total debt. 57 Accord-
ingly, if any of the co-obligors pay more than their fair portion of the debt, 
they can recover the excess from their co-obligors in a contribution action. ss 
A judgment entered for one co-obligor in an action by the obligee must be 
considered in light of the suretyship relation among the co-obligors in order 
properly to resolve the question of the effect of such a judgment on the 
obligee's rights against the remaining co-obligors. 
There are three main ways in which the questions of the effect of a judg-
ment for one co-obligor on the rights of the obligee and the other co-obligor 
have generally been resolved. First, a judgment for one co-obligor in certain 
situations bars any recovery by the obligee from the remaining co-obligor, 
in which case the question of contribution does not arise. Second, in other 
situations, a judgment for one co-obligor does not preclude the obligee 
from recovering the full amount of his claim from the remaining co-obligor, 
but does prevent the co-obligor found liable from recovering contributipn 
from the prevailing co-obligor. Third, in still other cases, a judgment for 
one co-obligor does not preclude the obligee from recovering the full 
amount of the claim from the remaining co-obligor, and does not prevent 
the co-obligor found liable from recovering contribution from the prevail-
ing co-obligor. 
As the Eastern Electrical Co. opinion reflects, 59 the courts tend to regard 
the issue of the effect of a judgment for one co-obligor on the liability of the 
remaining co-obligor as simply a matter of deciding whether the judgment 
for the co-obligor should be regarded as a ruling on the merits which pre-
" The same approach should be taken to the question of whether different judgments can be 
rendered for different co-obligors in one lawsuit and whether a judgment for one co-obligor in 
one lawsuit precludes a subsequent suit against other co-obligors. Compare REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS§ 291 with id. § 292. 
" 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 924 (1941). 
, /d. 
" /d. 
" See 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 123-25, 414 N.E.2d at 1030-31. 
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eludes the obligee from recovering from the remaining obligors or as a 
defense personal to the prevailing co-obligor which does . not affect the 
liability of the remaining co-obligors. Questions concernins the contribu-
tion rights of the co-obligors inter se often seem to be ignored in ruling on 
the rights of the obligee against the co-obligors. It is, however, helpful to 
consider such questions in light of the more complex scheme of possible 
resolutions outlined above. 
Cases in which one co-obligor prevails on the merits, or, more precisely, 
on a defense which is necessarily common to all co-obligo~s. fall into the 
category in which the judgment for one co-obligor discharges the other co-
obligors and hence moots any issues of contribution. 60 Iss~es concerning 
contribution do, however, have a great deal to do with the rule that a judg-
ment on the merits for one co-obligor discharges the other ;co-obligors. In 
situations in which the co-obligors 'liability is joint, the rule that a judgment 
on the merits for one co-obligor bars judgment against the others might be 
based without analysis on the old rule of joint obligations that judgment · 
must go for or against all co-obligors alike. In the case of je~>int and several 
obligations, however, that avenue was not open to the courts, and more 
serious analysis was required. Thus, in a Missouri case, Taylor v. Sartori-
ous, 61 which arose after the enactment of a statute converting all joint obli-
gations into joint and several obligations, it was held that an earlier judg-
ment on the merits for one co-obligor would preclude recovery against the 
other obligors on res judicata grounds, notwithstanding that the parties in 
the two suits differed. The court noted that if the res judicata defense were 
not allowed, the prevailing obligor might lose the benefit of his victory if a 
subsequent suit goes against a co-obligor and the co-obligor brings a contri-
bution action agaiQ.st the first co-obligor. 
The clearest situation in which a defense personal to one co-obligor does 
not preclude the entry of judgment against other co-obligors, but does bar 
contribution, is that of discharge in bankruptcy. Clearly the discharge in 
bankruptcy of one co-obligor should not prevent the oblig~e from recover-
ing from the other co-obligors. 62 Indeed, it will often be the case that the 
very reason that the obligee obtained the promises of sever~ obligors was to 
protect himself against the possibility of the insolvency of one of the 
obligors. It would, however, be inconsistent with the objectives of the 
bankruptcy system to deprive the obligor of the benefit of his discharge by 
•• For convenience, I refer to such cases as ones in which one co-obligor prevailed "on the 
merits" although the category may well cover grounds for ruling against th~ obligee which are 
not rulings on the merits, as for example, a successful statute of frauds defense, so long as the 
defense is one which would apply equally to all of the co-obligors. 
61 130 Mo. App. 23, 108 S.W. 1089 (1905); accord Spencer v. Dearth, 43 Vt. 98 (1870); 
Townsend v. Riddle, 2 N.H. 448 (1822). 
62 E.g., Hathaway v. Crocker, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 262 (1843). 
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forcing him to pay discharged debts through the roundabout method of a 
contribution action. Accordingly, at least where the bankruptcy statute pro-
vides that contingent claims of sureties can be proved in the bankruptcy 
proceedings, an obligor's discharge in bankruptcy will bar a contribution 
action against him by his co-obligor as well as a direct action against him by 
the obligee. u 
Most of the personal defenses which do not preclude the entry of judg-
ment against co-obligors appear to have been placed in the third category, 
that is, judgment for one co-obligor in an action by the obligee bars neither 
an action by the obligee against the remaining co-obligors nor a contribu-
tion action against the obligor who was successful in the obligee's suit 
against him. 14 While it may seem anomalous to allow such a circuitous form 
of recovery against an obligor who prevailed in the original suit, there may 
be situations in which this is appropriate. For example, if one obligor 
prevails in an action by the obligee on the basis of a defense of lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction, it seems entirely proper to allow the obligee to recover 
from other co-obligors over whom he can obtain personal jurisdiction, and 
leave it to the co-obligors against whom judgment is entered to track down 
their co-obligor in a place where he can be served with process in a contribu-
tion action. Statute of limitation defenses have generally been treated in the 
same fashion," although with less justification. The usual explanation of 
the rule that a co-obligor can be held liable in a contribution action even 
though the statute of limitations has run on a direct action against him by 
the obligee is that the contribution cause of action does not arise until the 
co-obligor has actually paid the common obligation." Although this may 
undercut whatever policies are thought to be served by statutes of limita-
tion, it may be that the rule reflects the fact that statutes of limitation do not 
embody particularly strong policies or that the problems prompting the 
enactment of statutes of limitation are less severe when the underlying con-
tract dispute has been litigated, albeit between different parties, in at least 
one timely action. 
The specific problem involved in Eastern Electrical Co. - dismissal of 
one co-obligor as a result of the obligee's failure to answer interrogatories 
- does not fit well within any of the three categories thus far considered. 
" Mace v. Wells, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 272 (1849). Presumably, a defense of contractual in-
capacity, such as infancy, which does not preclude the obligee from proceeding against other 
co-obligors, Woodward v. Newhall, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 500 (1823), should be treated, for pur-
poses of contribution, in the same way as a defense of discharge in bankruptcy, since otherwise 
the benefit of the defense would be lost. 
•• See, e.g., Quintin v. Magnant, 285 Mass. 450, 189 N.E. 209 (1934). 
" See, e.g., id. 
" See, e.g., Seabury v. Sibley, 183 Mass. 108, 66 N.E. 590 (1903); Wood v. Leland, 42 
Mass. (1 Met.) 387 (1840). 
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Although the point is debatable, it may be that, as the Appeals Court ruled, 
such a default by Eastern should not be regarded as sufficiently serious to 
preclude any recovery by it against co-obligors, as would be dbne if the rul-
ing had been an actual determination on the merits against Eastern. How-
ever, neither of the rules usually applied to defenses personal to one co-
obligor seems fair in this situation. Surely the judgment dismissing 
Eastern's action against South should not bar a contribution action by 
Taylor against South in the event that Taylor is forced to pay the entire debt 
to Eastern, for it would be extremely unfair to Taylor to force it to bear the 
entire burden of the common debt solely because of Eastern's default. On 
the other hand, if Eastern is allowed to recover in full from Taylor and 
Taylor's contribution action against South is not barred, then Eastern has 
actually suffered no loss, and South has obtained no benefit, as the result of 
the dismissal of Eastern's action against South. Dismissal of plaintiff's ac-
tion for failure to comply with discovery orders is usually thqught of as the 
most severe sanction. It would certainly be hard to justify a total emascula-
tion of this sanction in cases against joint obligors. 
In Eastern Electrical Co. the Appeals Court did not rule directly on the 
question of Taylor's rights against South after Taylor pays tQe judgment to 
Eastern. 67 The trial court had ruled that the judgment against Taylor could 
be satisfied out of the assets of the joint venture and, to the extent that 
Taylor's own assets were used, Taylor could treat this as a contribution to 
the joint venture in any future accounting between the two. 611 The Appeals 
Court stated that it could not, on the record before it, rule on the question 
of the rights of Taylor and South since that question might be affected by 
various matters concerning the joint venture agreement and the transactions 
between the parties concerning the construction project. 69 It does seem fair-
ly clear, however, that the Appeals Court did not contemplate that Taylor 
would, by virtue of the dismissal of South, be precluded from recovering 
" See 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 125, 414 N.E.2d at 1031. 
" /d. at 114, 414 N.E.2d at 1025. 
" Id. at 125, 414 N.E.2d at 1031. 
The Appeals Court phrased the question as whether Taylor "can charge the amount so paid 
as a construction cost, for which Taylor is entitled to credit in the settlement bf the accounts of 
the joint venture and between the participants in the joint venture and the owner," and stated 
that this would depend, among other things, on the amounts pa:d or due to the joint venture 
from the owner, whether the upset price has been reached, the amount oficompensation re-
ceived or losses borne by the joint venturers, and the extent to which South and the owner were 
under common control. /d. This discussion should not be taken to mean that Taylor must find 
some source in the contract between it and South upon which to base its right to recover from 
South, since the right of contribution arises from equitable principles not frop~. contract, Quin-
tin v. Magnant, 285 Mass. 450, 451 (1934). The contractual relations between Taylor and 
South may, of course, be relevant to modify the usual presumption that co-obligors are entitled 
to contribution to achieve a pro rata distribution of the total amount paid; See id. 
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anything from South. Rather, the Appeals Court's reluctance to rule on the 
matter of the rights between Taylor and South seems to have stemmed from 
the absence of sufficient facts upon which to determine the portion of the 
liability which each was to bear. 
Thus, it does seem quite likely that the ultimate effect of the Appeals 
Court's ruling will be that the default dismissal of Eastern's claim against 
South will have had no effect. On the particular facts of the case, that may 
not have been all that inappropriate. In a footnote, the Appeals Court 
stated that although the matter was not before it, it had considerable doubt 
whether it was proper to have entered the judgment dismissing Eastern's 
claim against South rather than employing some lesser sanction. 70 It would 
be unfortunate, however, if the Eastern Electrical Co. case were applied in 
cases in which the severe sanction of dismissal of a plaintiff's action for 
failure to comply with discovery rules or other procedural rules or court 
orders does seem warranted. Accordingly, it may be appropriate for the 
courts in such situations to consider another possible resolution of the rights 
of the obligee against the obligors and the obligors among themselves in 
order to give some effect to such a dismissal. 
As has been noted, co-obligors can be viewed as principal debtors for 
their pro rata portion of the entire debt and sureties of their co-debtors for 
the remainder. Under the law of suretyship, an obligee's release of the prin-
cipal debtor often has the effect of discharging the surety. 71 To be sure, this 
has proved to be a troublesome rule in the context of releases of sureties, 
whether in the context of co-debtors or elsewhere. 72 However, the 
suretyship principle can be applied to achieve a more appropriate solution 
of problems of the sort presented in Eastern Electrical Co. The dismissal 
of Eastern's action against South as a sanction for Eastern's failure to 
answer interrogatories could be viewed, insofar as Taylor's rights are in-
volved, as discharging South altogether, and, therefore, as discharging 
Taylor to the extent that Taylor is surety for South. If Taylor and South as 
co-obligors would have been liable pro rata among themselves, then the 
dismissal of South should leave Taylor liable for only one-half of the total 
debt. If the two had agreed among themselves to share the liability in some 
different proportion, Taylor could have been given the opportunity to make 
such a showing, and Taylor would be liable to Eastern only for its agreed 
proportion. 
It seems fairly evident from the opinion of the Appeals Court in Eastern 
Electrical Co. that in the future the court will not allow the technical distinc-
tion between joint obligations and joint and several obligations to dictate 
'" 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 123 n.I2, 414 N.E.2d at 1030 n.I2. 
71 RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY§ 122 (1941). 
72 See generally 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§§ 931-34 (1951). 
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the outcome of cases. It is perhaps a testament to the contitluing ability of 
that distinction to engender confusion that the court does not, however, ap-
pear to have noticed that that distinction was irrelevant in the, instant case or 
to have considered adequately the problems actually presented. It is to be 
hoped that Eastern Electrical Co. foreshadows the demise of the distinction 
between joint obligations and joint and several obligations in those situa-
tions where it actually may make a difference. Furthermore, the case is an 
apt illustration of the fact that even after the deadwood of the common law 
is cleared away, difficult problems remain in resolving questions concerning 
the obligations of multiple promisors of the same performance. 
§ 1.3. Fraudulent Conveyances - Liability of Transferee~ In Northbor-
ough National Bank v. Risley,' the Supreme Judicial Court held that a re-
cipient of a fraudulent conveyance who returns to the debtor the proceeds 
of the property conveyed is not liable to the debtor's creditors. The debtor, 
Allen, conveyed certain real estate to his wife for nominal consideration at 
about the time that one of his creditors filed suit to collect a debt due from 
Allen. 2 The wife then conveyed the property to her brother-in-law, Risley, 
without consideration. 3 Seven months later, the Aliens arranged for the sale 
of the property to unrelated parties who in good faith paid Risley a fair 
consideration for the property} Risley immediately turned over the pro-
ceeds of the sale to the Aliens. 5 
One of Allen's creditors then brought suit against Risley seeking recovery 
of the amount received by Risley from the sale of the property on the theory 
that the conveyance to Risley was a fraudulent conveyance. 6 The trial court 
awarded a judgment to the plaintiff, ruling that the debtor transferred the 
property with intent to defraud creditors and that Risley knowingly par-
ticipated in the fraud. 7 While the sale of the property to a bona fide pur-
chaser cut off plaintiff's rights to the property itself, the trial court held that 
Risley was accountable for the proceeds of the sale and was not absolved by 
turning over the sale proceeds to the debtor. 1 Risley app~aled, and the 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed. Chief Justice Hennessey dissented. 
Justice Braucher's opinion for the majority noted that ~n the facts as 
found by the trial court the conveyance to Risley was fraudU!lent under sec-
tion 7 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act ("UFC~") as a "con-
veyance made . . . with actual intent . . . to hinder, delay, or defraud ... 
§ 1.3. ' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1910, 424 N.E.2d 522. 
' ld. at 1911, 424 N.E.2d at 522. 
3 ld . 
• ld. 
' ld. at 1911, 424 N.E.2d at 522-23. 
• Id. at 1911, 424 N.E.2d at 523. 
' Id. at 1911-12, 424 N.E.2d at 523. 
I Jd. 
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creditors."9 Thus, had the property not been sold by Risley, Allen's 
creditors could have recovered it from Risley under section 9 of the 
UFCA. 10 Moreover, the Court noted that prior Massachusetts cases 
established that upon the sale of the property Risley might be held personal-
ly liable to the extent of the proceeds remaining in his hands. 11 
The Court then considered the effect of Risley's return of the sale pro-
ceeds to the debtors. The majority opinion referred to a number of Massa-
chusetts cases in which transferees who actively participated in the 
fraudulent scheme were not permitted to reduce their liability to the trans-
feror's creditors by showing that some of the property received by them had 
been used to pay other creditors of the transferor. 12 However, in Mod in v. 
Hanron, 13 those cases had been held inapplicable in a situation much like 
that involved in the Risley case on the grounds that transferee was less guilty 
of active participation in the scheme and had voluntarily reconveyed the 
property to the original grantor. The plaintiff in Risley sought to distinguish 
Modin on the basis that in Modin the property transferred had been re-
turned to the debtor while in Risley the property was sold and the proceeds 
returned. 14 Justice Braucher rejected plaintiff's argument stating that the 
change in the form of the asset was not dispositive.•' Inasmuch as the de-
fendant Risley was simply used as an instrument in the debtor's scheme, had 
minimal knowledge of the facts, and neither sought nor received any benefit 
from the transaction, the Court ruled that Risley was absolved from liability 
under the principle of the Modin case. 16 
Chief Justice Hennessey dissented, stating that "[w]hatever the merits of 
the rule established in [Modin], the application or extension of the rule to 
sanction the defendant's conduct in the present case is unwarranted."•' The 
Chief Justice suggested that Modin holds that the transferee's liability turns 
on the extent of his participation in the transferor's fraudulent scheme. 18 
Chief Justice Hennessey argued that Risley was distinguishable from Modin 
on the grounds that the defendant in Modin acted only as a custodian for 
the transferor's funds and returned the property to the transferor in the 
' /d. at 1912, 424 N.E.2d at 523 (citing G.L. c. 109A, § 7). 
10 /d. (citing G.L. c. 109A, § 9). 
II /d. 
" Id. (citing R.E. McDonald Co. v. Finkovitch, 270 Mass. 362, 366-67, 170 N.E. 112, 114 
(1930); Massachusetts Trust Co. v. Simon Mfg. Co., 237 Mass. 92, 96, 129 N.E. 432, 433 
(1921); Manufacturers Nat'! Bank v. Simon Mfg. Co., 233 Mass. 85, 89, 123 N.E. 340, 343 
(1919)). 
" 346 Mass. 629 (1964). 
14 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1913, 424 N.E.2d at 523. 
" /d. 
16 /d. 
17 /d. at 1913, 424 N.E.2d at 524. 
II /d. 
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same form. 19 By contrast, Risley accepted a transfer of real ~state- a form 
of property which creditors may readily attach or inhibit transfer of - and 
aided the debtor in transforming the property into cash, knowing that the 
debtor's creditor was attempting to attach the property involved. 20 The 
Chief Justice regarded this conduct as sufficiently active participation by 
the defendant to render him liable under Modin. 21 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Risley seem to have re-
garded the issue as whether Risley's conduct fell within the protections of 
the rule established in Modin. Both opinions seems to regard Modin as an 
exception to an otherwise applicable rule that the return of the property to 
the debtor or to other creditors of the debtor will often not absolve the 
transferee of liability, as illustrated by cases such as Manufacturers Na-
tional Bank v. Simon Manufacturing Co., 22 Massachusetts Trust Co. v. 
Simon Manufacturing Co., 23 and R.E. McDonald Co. v. Finkovitch, 24 
which held that a recipient of a fraudulent conveyance was liable for the 
value of the property received notwithstanding his payment of other 
creditors ofthe debtor from the proceeds of the property received. These 
cases, however, are best seen as establishing not a general rule from which 
Modin was an exception, but as themselves representing limited exceptions 
to the rule that the transferee's return of the property or its proceeds to the 
debtor or his creditors absolves the transferee from liability :to the debtor's 
creditors. 
The core of fraudulent conveyance law is the proposition that a debtor 
should not be permitted to impede his creditors' efforts to collect their 
claims by transactions which result in the depletion of the debtor's estate. zs 
Accordingly, as both the majority and dissenting opinions in Risley 
reco$nize, 26 a transferee who returns the property to the debtor will general-
ly not be held liable to the debtor's creditors, since he no longer holds prop-
erty of the debtor and since the debtor's estate has not been depleted. 27 In 
order to consider the extent to which cases such as Manufacrurers National 
Bank warrant exceptions to that rule, it is necessary to con~ider the issues 
raised by a transferee's payment of the transferor's creditors. It was long 
ago established in Massachusetts law that the transferee's use of the proper-
ty to repay creditors of the debtor has the same effect as a return of the 
" /d. at 1913-14, 424 N.E.2d at 523. 
20 /d. at 1914, 424 N.E.2d at 523. 
2
' /d. at 1915, 424 N.E.2d at S24. 
22 233 Mass. SS (1919). 
2
' 237 Mass. 92 (1921). 
24 270 Mass. 366 (1930). 
25 E.g., 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 275 (1940). 
2
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1913, 1914-15, 424 N.E.2d at 523, S24. 
27 1 G. GLENN, supra note 2S, at § 57. 
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property to the debtor. In an 1815 case, Thomas v. Goodwin/8 a merchant 
in failing circumstances conveyed all of his assets to one of his creditors in 
exchange for a promissory note of the transferee payable to the order of the 
debtor. The debtor subsequently directed the transferee to pay the note to 
various of the debtor's creditors. The Court held that such payments by the 
transferee absolved him of any liability to unpaid creditors of the debtor: 
Although previously to [the time that the fraudulent conveyance ac-
tion was initiated] the person summoned as trustee may have received 
the property of the debtor under circumstances which would render 
him liable, yet, if he has since discharged himself of all trust by 
delivering back to the debtor the property received, in such manner 
that it may be attached by his creditors, or if he has paid the proceeds 
to bona fide creditors of the principal in satisfaction of their just 
demands, so that at the time of service of the writ he truly has nothing 
in his hands, he cannot be subjected to a judgment. 29 
Prior to the 1919 case of Manufacturers National Bank v. Simon Manufac-
turing Co., 30 the rule of Thomas v. Goodwin seems never to have been ques-
tioned. 31 Indeed, the validity of the common law assignment for the benefit 
of creditors as a liquidating device depends on the proposition that it is not 
a fraudulent conveyance for an insolvent debtor to convey his property to 
an assignee who agrees to use the property to pay the claims of the trans-
feror's creditors. 32 Even in situations not amounting to a general assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors, a conveyance, otherwise fraudulent, 
followed by the transferee's payment of certain of the transferor's debts is 
at most an indirect form of a preference, and it is well settled that a 
preference is not a fraudulent conveyance. 33 
In Manufacturers National Bank v. Simon Manufacturing Co., 34 
however, the Court carved out an exception to the rule of Thomas v. Good-
win. In that case the principal of a corporation in financial difficulties 
organized a new corporation and caused the old corporation to convey all 
21 12 Mass. 140 (1815). 
" /d. at 141-42. 
•• 233 Mass. 85, 123 N.E. 340 (1919). 
" See Adams v. Young, 200 Mass. 588, 591, 86 N.E. 942, 943 (1909); Pierce v. LeMonier, 
172 Mass. 508, 512, 53 N.E. 125, 128 (1899); Cavill v. Emery, 148 Mass. 32, 34, 18 N.E. 574, 
575 (1888); Harvey v. Varney, 98 Mass. 118, 120 (1867); Crowninshield v. Kittridge, 48 Mass. 
(7 Met.) 520 (1844); Oriental Bank v. Haskins, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 332, 340 (1841). 
32 G. GLENN, supra note 25, at§§ 208-09; G. GLENN, THE LAw GoVERNING LIQUIDATION§§ 
106-07 (1935). It should be noted, however, that Massachusetts follows the peculiar rule that 
an assignment for the benefit of creditors is not valid unless assented to by a majority of the 
creditors. Sinclair v. Napoli Cafeteria, 244 Mass. 221, 138 N.E. 327 (1923). 
" E.g., Banca Italiani di Sconto v. Bailey, 260 Mass. 151, 157 N.E. 40 (1929). 
•• 233 Mass. 85, 123 N.E. 340 (1919). 
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of its assets to the new corporation without consideration. 35 The new cor-
poration ~arried on the business in the same manner and at ~he same loca-
tion. 36 In order to remain in business, the new corporation paid off various 
debts of the old corporation to trade creditors. 37 A bank which had lent 
money to the old corporation brought suit seeking to establish that the new 
corporation was liable for the debts of its predecessor at least to the extent 
of the value of the property conveyed to it by the old corporation. 31 On 
these facts the Court ruled that the transfer of the assets of the old corpora-
tion to the new corporation was a fraudulent conveyance and that the new 
corporation could not be absolved of liability by virtue of its payments to 
trade creditors of the predecessor corporation." Curiously, the Court did 
not discuss or even cite Thomas v. Goodwin, and the cases which the Court 
did cite in support of the proposition that the transferee shoulp not be given 
credit for payments to the transferor's creditors fall far short of establishing 
that proposition. 40 Nonetheless, on its particular facts, the case seems cor-
rectly decided. As the Court noted, the payments to the predecessor cor-
poration's trade creditors were an integral part of the scheme to continue 
the business in a form which would insulate it from liability to the bank 
creditors. 41 Presumably, the payments to trade creditors were made in order 
to preserve the business' credit with its suppliers, so that it set)ms likely that 
the business was incurring additional trade debts as the old ones were paid 
off. Thus, unlike the situation in Thomas v. Goodwin, 42 the p$yments prob-
ably did not reduce the aggregate liabilities of the enterpris~. Faced with 
such a transparent effort to defeat creditors by the manipuJation of cor-
porate forms it is hardly surprising that the Court adopted fraudulent con-
" Id. at 88, 123 N.E. at 343. 
36 /d. 
" /d. at 89-90, 123 N.E. at 343. 
" Id. at 87, 123 N.E. at 342. 
" /d. at 89-90, 123 N.E. at 343. 
•• The principal cases cited by the court were Wall v. Provident lnstitutiop for Savings, 85 
Mass. (3 Allen) 96 (1861) (grantor cannot recover property fraudulently co~veyed); Fiske v. 
Fiske, 173 Mass. 413, 53 N.E. 916 (1899) (same); Lawtor v. Estes, 167 Massl181, 45 N.E. 90 
(1896) (creditor who participated in fraudulent scheme estopped from attacking it as 
fraudulent conveyance); Lynde v. McGregor, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 172 (1866) (mortgage on 
property having value far in excess of amount of debt is fraudulent and is not rendered valid by 
subsequent advances); Bolster v. Graves, 189 Mass. 301, 75 N.E. 714 (1905) (mortgage 
voidable as preference under insolvency statute is not rendered valid by subsequent advances); 
Lamb v. Mcintire, 183 Mass. 367, 67 N.E. 320 (1903) (mortgage on property having value far 
in excess of amount of debt is fraudulent and is not enforceable even to extent of amount of ac-
tual debt); Rubenstein v. Lottow, 220 Mass. 156, 107 N.E. 718 (1915) (purdhase of accounts 
voidable as fraudulent conveyance where made to provide funds to keq, debtor out of 
bankruptcy for sufficient period of time to avoid attack on prior preferentiai payment) . 
• , 233 Mass. at 90, 123 N.E. at 343. 
42 12 Mass. 140 (1815). 
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veyance theory in order to hold the successor corporation liable for the 
debts of its predecessor. 43 
The other principal case cited in Risley in which a transferee of a 
fraudulent conveyance was not given credit for payments to the transferor's 
creditors was R.E. McDonald Co. v. Finkovitch. 44 In that case, after the 
debtor had notified his creditors of his financial difficulties, one of his 
creditors, representing himself and two other creditors, proposed to the 
debtor that his business be liquidated by transferring all of his assets to the 
creditor who would use the property to pay the debtor's debts to himself 
and his confederates and to pay 300Jo of the claims of other creditors upon 
their agreement to give the debtor a six month extension. 4 ' The creditor also 
promised to extend further credit to the debtor to enable him to remain in 
business to earn enough to pay the balance of his debts. 46 The creditor 
managed to obtain the consent of the other creditors to an extension 
without paying them the 300Jo dividend, and simply applied the property 
received from the debtor to the claims of himself and his confederates. 47 
The creditor who proposed the scheme was held to be liable to the other 
creditors for the value of the property received by the debtor without deduc-
tion for the amounts applied to his claim or those of his confederates. 48 The 
case seems to establish only that there are limits to the proposition that a 
preference is not a fraudulent conveyance. The determinative factor seems 
to have been that the defendant creditors not only received a preferential 
payment, but also, through less than honest means, persuaded other 
creditors to hold off for a period of six months, to the possible prejudice of 
their rights under federal bankruptcy law. 49 
The situation presented in the Risley case, or the Modin case, seems to 
share none of the specific characteristics which warranted the results in the 
Manufacturers National Bank or R.E. McDonald Co. cases. Thus, to the 
extent that the plaintiff's argument in Risley rests on such cases, it was 
properly rejected. 
It is possible, however, that the plaintiff in Risley might have based its 
case on a somewhat different theory. If we collapse the transactions by 
" In Massachusetts Trust Co. v. Simon Mfg. Co., 237 Mass. 92, 129 N.E 432 (1921), a case 
involving the same debtor involved in the Manufacturers Nat'/ Bank case, the principle of the 
earlier case was extended, without much discussion, to the somewhat different situation of an 
individual closely affiliated with the company who had, for a time, held the funds of the cor-
poration in his personal bank account, apparently to prevent creditors from reaching them. 
The individual was held liable to the company's creditors on a fraudulent conveyance theory 
and was not given credit for amounts paid to creditors of the company. 
44 270 Mass. 362, 170 N.E. ll2 (1930) . 
., Id. at 364, 170 N.E. at 113. 
46 Id. at 364-65, 170 N.E. at 113. 
47 /d. at 365, 170 N.E. at 113. 
41 Id. at 367, 170 N.E. at ll4. 
4
' See id. at 366, 170 N.E. at ll3-l4. 
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which Risley obtained the property for no consideration and then sold it to 
a bona fide purchaser turning over the proceeds to the debtor, the case 
becomes analogous to one in which a debtor, intending to hinder his 
creditors, sells property to another for a fair consideration where the 
transferee is fully aware of the debtor's fraudulent purpose. Section 7 of the 
UFCA states that actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors 
renders a conveyance fraudulent. ' 0 By its terms, the adequacy of the con-
sideration received is not relevant under section 7. While section 9 of the 
UFCA protects bona fide purchasers for fair consideration from any liabili-
ty and protects purchasers who give less than fair consideration, without ac-
tual fraudulent intent, to the extent of the consideration given, 51 it appears 
that a conveyance to a purchaser with actual fraudulent intent can be set 
aside even if he gave fair consideration. 
Indeed, in Massachusetts, as in other jurisdictions, one can find dozens 
of cases in which the proposition is asserted that a conveyance made by the 
debtor with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors can be 
recovered from a transferee who participated in the fraud even if fair con-
sideration was given. It is quite interesting, however, that there appear to be 
few cases in which this general proposition has actually been applied in 
cases in which it was clearly shown that the transferee did give fair con-
sideration. Most of the statements that fair consideration is irrelevant in 
cases of actual fraud seem to be pure dicta in cases in which the issue was 
not presented. 52 In many other cases in which such statements appear, the 
proposition actually seems to function only as a convenient way for an ap-
pellate court to dispose of a transferee's contention, disbelieved by the 
finder of fact, that he did give fair consideration. 53 e 
In Risley, or in any other case in which a transferee gives fair considera-
tion, though with knowledge of the transferor's fraudulent purpose, the 
"fraud" must be of a very different sort than in the usual fraudulent con-
veyance situation. The core concern of fraudulent conveyance law is the 
•• G.L. c. 109A, § 7. 
" G.L. c. 109A, § 9. 
" E.g., Merchants Discount Co. v. Esther Abelson, Inc., 297 Mass. 517,520,9 N.E.2d 528, 
530 (1937); Cohen v. Levy, 221 Mass. 336, 339, 108 N.E. 1074, 1075 (1915); Gately v. Kappler, 
209 Mass. 426, 431, 95 N.E. 859, 861 (1911); Pierce v. O'Brien, 189 Mass. 58, 60, 75 N.E. 61, 
62 (1905). 
" A case relied on by Judge Hennessey in his dissent, Hickman v. Thielman, 147 Cal. 
App.2d 11, 304 P.2d 122 (1956), is a classic example. Concerning the transferee's contention 
that she had returned the property to the debtor, the court stated, ''The [trial] court was not re-
quired to believe her testimony and we must assume that the court did not believe it. But there 
is evidence to support the fmdings that [the transferee] conspired with the others to defraud 
plaintiff and if, as the court found, she received the money with that intention and purpose, 
returning the money to [the debtor] would not have relieved her of responsibility." /d. at 15, 
304 P.2d at 125. 
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prevention of transfers of the debtor's property which diminish his estate 
otherwise available to creditors. In Risley, or any other case where the 
transferee has given full consideration, no such diminution has occurred. 
Rather, the fraud, if any, in such cases can only be that the debtor has con-
verted assets from a form easily reached by creditors, such as real estate, in-
to a form, such as cash, which may more easily be secreted by the debtor. 
The author has been unable to find any case in Massachusetts in which such 
a transformation, without more, has been held to be a fraudulent con-
veyance. 54 It may well be that some sanction to deter such conduct is 
desirable; however, the sanction of a forfeiture of the property for which 
fair consideration has been given may often seem overly severe. 
On the particular facts of the Risley case, the participation of Risley in 
the debtor's scheme seems to have been limited to holding title to the real 
estate until the time that the debtor located a buyer for the property. In this 
situation, there seems to be adequate protection for the debtor's creditors, 
and adequate sanctions against the debtor's conduct, that awarding a judg-
ment against Risley would be unnecessarily harsh. Since Risley did not give 
any consideration at the time of the original conveyance to him, that con-
veyance could have been set aside by Allen's creditors prior to the time that 
the property was sold to a bona fide purchaser and the proceeds turned over 
to Allen by Risley.B To some extent, then, the loss of the property to 
Allen's creditors was a result of their lack of diligence in pursuing it during 
the seven month period it was held by Risley. Moreover, the Court's ruling 
that Risley's return of the proceeds of the property to the debtor discharged 
him from liability would not seem to be a holding that the debtor did not 
make a fraudulent conveyance, but rather a ruling that the transferee was 
absolved from liability for this fraudulent conveyance by his subsequent 
conduct. Accordingly, there may remain other sanctions to deter conduct of 
the sort involved in this case. Thus, the debtor, having made a fraudulent 
conveyance, might be barred from obtaining a discharge in bankruptcy 
under section 727 of the federal bankruptcy code. ' 6 Moreover, an attorney 
who participates in such a transaction may well be subject to disciplinary ac-
•• There do, however, appear to be a few such cases in other jurisdictions. In Green v. Tan-
tum, 19 N.J. Eq. lOS (1865) a judgment was entered against the debtor in an action for breach 
of a promise to marry. The day the judgment was entered, the debtor left New Jersey and 
travelled to his brother's home in Delaware and sold to his brother all of his property, con-
sisting mainly of seven mortgages on property in New Jersey, for a fair consideration. The 
debtor never openly returned to New Jersey. The court ruled that the debtor's brother must 
have known that the conveyance was designed to place the debtor's property beyond the reach 
of his judgment creditor in New Jersey and held that the conveyance would be set aside 
notwithstanding the adequacy of the consideration paid by the brother. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1912, 424 N.E.2d at 523. 
" 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). 
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tion" - a matter which, from the volume of reported cases involving 
fraudulent conveyances in which an attorney participated in effecting the 
transaction, does not seem to be sufficiently considered by the bar. 
' . § 1.4. Bank Deposits and Collections - Wrongful Dlshon~r of Checks. 
In Raymer v. Bay State National Bank1 the Supreme Judicial Court wa8 
confronted with the recurring problem of determining whether a bank had 
proceeded too far along the process of determining to pay a check for it to 
be permitted to dishonor it. Raymer Products Corp. ("the company") was 
a customer of the defendant bank, maintaining a commercial checking ac-
count and being indebted to the bank on a number of loans secured by a real 
estate mortgage and security interests covering machin¢ry, accounts 
receivable, and inventory. 1 During 197S and 1976 the company encountered 
financial difficulties, although it missed no payments on its loans from the 
bank. 3 On July 1S, 1976, a loan officer of the bank told the company that a 
separate account would be established the following week for the deposit of 
collections of accounts receivable, but stated that until that time the com-
pany should continue to make deposits aQd pay bills as it had done in the 
past.• Thirteen checks drawn by the company were presented to the bank 
for payment on Friday, July 16, and an additional thirteen checks were 
presented on Monday, July 19.' There were sufficient funds in the com-
pany's account to cover the checks and they were posted in acl;ordance with 
the bank's usual procedures by 6 a.m. of the banking day following the day 
of receipt. 6 On Tuesday, July 20, representatives of the company and the 
bank metat the bank at 3 p.m. to discuss the company's financial affairs. 7 
While the meeting was going on, and unknown to the comparl.y's represent-
atives, a bank officer was at the company's plant taking poss~ssion of all of 
its property as collateral for the loans. 8 Later that day, the twenty-six 
checks, totaling $36,463.73, were returned for "uncollected funds" and the 
bank recredited the company's account with the amount of the checks and 
then set off the entire balance in the checking account against loans due to 
the bank.' Within a month, the company filed a petition under chapter XI 
" D.R. 7-102(A)(7), S.J.C. Rule 3:22, 359 Mass. 787, 819-20 (1971) ("In his representation 
of a client, a lawyer shall not ... counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to 
be illegal or fraudulent."). 
§ 1.4. ' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1870, 424 N.E.2d SIS. 
' ld. at 1872, 424 N.E.2d at Sl7. 
'ld . 
• ld. 
'ld. 
' ld. at 1872-73, 424 N.E.2d at 517. 
' Id. at 1873, 424 N.E.2d at 517. 
• Id. at 1873, 424 N.E.2d at Sl7-18. 
• ld. at 1872-73, 424 N.E.2d at 517-18. 
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of the Bankruptcy Act, and an arrangement was confirmed in 1977. 10 Dur-
ing the course of the arrangement proceedings, the company assigned to 
Raymer, its president and principal shareholder, any claims it had against 
the bank arising out of the dishonor of the checks. 11 
Raymer filed suit against the bank alleging that the dishonor of the 
checks was wrongful under section 4-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
("U.C.C.") and was an unfair and deceptive act or practice under G.L. c. 
93A, § 11. 12 The trial judge ruled for the plaintiff on both counts and 
awarded plaintiff judgment for the face amount of the checks, plus at-
torneys' fees and costs. 13 The bank appealed the finding of liability and the 
plaintiff cross-appealed, contending that additional consequential damages 
should have been awarded. 14 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice 
Braucher, affirmed the decision of the trial court that the bank had 
wrongfully dishonored the checks but reversed the ruling that the plaintiff 
was entitled to recover substantial damages. The Court first rejected the 
bank's arguments that Raymer could not maintain suit on the company's 
claims assigned to him, affirming the trial court's rulings that the wrongful 
dishonor claims were assignable, that the action was not barred by the com-
pany's failure to schedule the claims as assets in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, and that the claims were not required to be raised as compulsory 
counterclaims in an adversary proceeding which the bank had filed against 
the company in the bankruptcy proceedings.•' The Court then turned to the 
merits of the wrongful dishonor claims. 
Since the company's indebtedness to the bank gave the bank the right to 
set off the balance in the company's deposit account, the critical question 
was whether the bank had exercised its right of set-off in a timely fashion. 
Justice Braucher's opinion noted that this question is determined by section 
4-303(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code which provides that any of the 
so-called "four legals," including a set-off, "comes too late to ... ter-
minate, suspend, or modify [the bank's] right or duty [to pay a check]" if 
the bank has taken any of several specified actions with respect to the 
check. 16 The two provisions of section 4-303(1) relevant to the Raymer case 
10 /d. at 1873, 424 N.E.2d at 518. 
II /d. 
12 /d. 
" /d. 
14 /d. 
" !d. at 1874-75, 424 N.E.2d at 518-19. 
16 Section 4-303(1), G.L. c. 106, § 4-303(1) provides that: 
Any knowledge, notice or stop-order received by, legal process served upon or set-off 
exercised by a payor bank, whether or not effective under other rules of law to termi-
nate, suspend or modify the bank's right or duty to pay an item or to charge its custom-
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were subsection 4-303(1)(d}, which provides that a set-off comes too late if 
the bank has completed the process of posting the check to the drawer's ac-
count "or otherwise has evidenced by examination of such: indicated ac-
count and by action its decision to pay the [check]," and subsection 
4-303(1)(e) which, when read in conjunction with related sections, 17 pro-
vides that a set-off comes too late if exercised after the bank's midnight 
deadline with respect to the item. 
As to the thirteen checks presented on Friday, July 16, the bank's mid-
night deadline was midnight of Monday, July 19. 18 Accordingly, the set-off 
exercised on July 20 came too late with respect to these checks, and their 
dishonor was wrongful. 19 Since the set-off occurred prior to the bank's mid-
night deadline with respect to the other thirteen checks, which were 
presented on July 19, the determinative provision concerning these checks 
was subsection (d) of section 4-303(1). 20 On the basis of the testimony of an 
officer of the bank, the trial court had found that the bank's usual pro-
cedure involved completion of posting by 6 a.m. on the day following 
receipt of items, and that, with respect to the July 19 checks, the bank had 
"completed the process of posting" and had "evidenced by examination of 
such indicated account and by action its decision to pay" the checks. 21 The 
er's account for the item, comes too late to so terminate, suspend or modify such right 
or duty if the knowledge, notice, stop-order or legal process is received or served and a 
reasonable time for the bank to act thereon expires or the set-off is exei'cised after the 
bank has done any of the following: 
(a) accepted or certified the item; 
(b) paid the item in cash; 
(c) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settlement and without 
having such right under statute, clearinghouse rule or agreement; 
(d) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the drawer, 
maker or other person to be charged therewith or otherwise has evidenced by ex-
amination of such indicated account and by action its decision to p•y the item; or 
(e) become accountable for the amount of the item under subsection (1)' (d) of Section 
4-213 and Section 4-302 dealing with the payor bank's responsibility for late return 
of items. 
" Under§ 4-213(1)(d) a payor bank becomes accountable for an item w!U:n it has "made a 
provisional settlement for the item and failed to revoke the settlement in the time and manner 
permitted by statute, clearinghouse rule or agreement." In the absence of a contrary clear-
inghouse rule or agreement, § 4-301 specifies that provisional settlements, must be revoked 
before the bank's "midnight deadline." Midnight deadline is defined by§ 4H04 as "midnight 
on its next banking day following the banking day on which it receives tile relevant item"; 
however, § 4-107 permits a bank to establish an afternoon cutoff hour of 2 p.m. or later after 
which time items will be deemed to have been received at the opening of the following banking 
day. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 187S, 424 N.E.2d at S19. 
" ld. at 187S-76, 424 N.E.2d at S19. 
•• Id. at 1876, 424 N.E.2d at S19. 
" ld. 
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Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the trial judge's findings were not clearly 
erroneous and, therefore, affirmed the ruling that the set-off came too late 
as to all of the checks and that their dishonor was wrongful. 22 
Turning to the question of damages, the Court upheld the trial court's 
finding of fact that the plaintiff had not shown that the dishonor of the 
checks was the proximate cause of any consequential damages, such as the 
deterioration of the company's financial condition. 23 The trial court's 
award of judgment for the plaintiff for the face amount of the checks was, 
however, reversed by the Court. 24 Although the Court left open the 
possibility that such recovery might be appropriate under section 4-402 in 
certain situations, Justice Braucher noted that there was no dispute as to the 
bank's right of set-off other than on the ground that it was untimely and 
that the only result of the wrongful dishonor was that the company's bank 
account was used to pay its debts to the bank rather than its debts to the 
payees of the checks. B Thus, damages measured by the face amount of the 
check would not reflect any actual loss suffered by the company. 26 Accord-
ingly, the Court ruled that the plaintiff could recover only nominal 
damages for the wrongful dishonors. 27 
Finally, the Court considered the issues presented under chapter 93A of 
the General Laws. The Court held that chapter 93A can be applied to 
banks, resolving an issue which had been left open in a number of prior 
cases, 28 and affirmed the trial judge's ruling that the dishonor of the checks 
was, in the circumstances of the present case, an unfair act or practice in 
violation of section 2 of chapter 93A. 29 Apparently, the critical factors 
leading to this conclusion were that the bank, having been fully apprised of 
the company's financial difficulties, assured the company that checks could 
continue to be drawn on the account, and then, shortly thereafter, made tlie 
wrongful dishonor by virtue of the untimely set-off at a time when the bank 
had adequate collateral for its loans. 30 Justice Braucher ruled, however, 
that since it had not been shown that the company had sustained any 
damage as a result of the wrongful dishonor, nor that the bank's violation 
of section 2 of chapter 93A was "willful or knowing," it was not improper 
for the trial court to deny an award of multiple damages. 31 The Court did, 
22 /d. 
" Id. at 1878, 424 N.E.2d at 520. 
" /d. at 1877-78, 424 N.E.2d at 520. 
"/d. 
26 /d. 
27 /d. 
2
' /d. at 1879, 424 N.E.2d at 521. 
" Id. at 1878-79, 424 N.E.2d at 521. 
•• See id. 
" Id. at 1879, 424 N.E.2d at 521. 
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however, affirm the trial judge's ruling that since the plaintiff did prove a 
violation of section 2 of chapter 93A it was appropriate to award plaintiff 
attorneys' fees pursuant to section 11 of chapter 93A. Accordingly, the 
Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the Superior Court 
for the entry of judgment for plaintiff for $1.00 as nominal damages plus 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
Aside from providing yet another illustration of the broad sweep of 
chapter 93A and the capacity of that statute to effect a de facto reversal of 
the traditional American rule concerning attorneys' fees, th¢ principal sig-
nificance of the Raymer case is its impact on the resolution Of the difficult 
family of problems concerning the specification of the point of no return in 
the process of the payment of checks by payor banks. The factual pattern 
involved in Raymer is a common one: a bank has taken all or nearly all of 
the steps which it customarily takes in the processing of the millions of 
checks about which nothing goes wrong and then discovers lhat something 
has gone wrong and seeks to avoid paying a check. One of the most well 
known legal problems to which such occurrences give rise is the controversy 
over the propriety of the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in West 
Side Bank v. Marine National Exchange Bank. 32 In the West Side Bank 
case, a check was presented to the payor bank on Friday morning and on 
that day's computer run was sorted, charged to the drawer's account and 
stamped paid. 33 On Monday, the bookkeeper checked the computer print-
outs, found sufficient funds to cover the check, photographed and can-
celled the check, and fJJ.ed it in the drawer's file. 34 Later on Monday, the 
drawer ordered payment stopped. In compliance with its customer's re-
quest, the payor bank reversed the entries made to the customer's account 
and returned the check to the presenting bank on Tuesday. 35 The presenting 
bank sued the payor bank arguing that final payment had occurred prior to 
the time the bank recejved the stop order and therefore the payor bank had 
become accountable for the amount of the checks under stction 4-213(1) 
which provides that a payor bank becomes accountable for an item as soon 
as it has taken any of certain specified actions with respect to the item, in-
cluding completion of the process of posting or failure to return the item 
within the prescribed time limits. 36 Although the return of the checks on 
" 37 Wis.2d~1. 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968). 
" ld. at 664, 155 N.W.2d at 589. 
,. ld. 
" ld. at 665, 155 N.W.2d at 589. 
" U.C.C. § 4-213(1) provides as follows: 
(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any of the follow-
ing, whichever happens first: · 
(a) paid the item in cash; or 
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settlement and 
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Tuesday would have been later than the usual statutory midnight deadline, 
a clearinghouse rule extended that time limit so that the return was not un-
timely unless the bank had completed the process of posting prior to the 
time the stop order was received. 37 The Wisconsin court held that the bank 
had not made final payment, since it had not completed the process of 
posting. 31 Section 4-109 provides that 
The "process of posting" means the usual procedure followed by a payor 
bank in determining to pay an item and in recording the payment including 
one or more of the following or other steps as determined by the· bank: 
(a) verification of any signature; 
(b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available; 
(c) affixing a "paid" or other stamp; 
(d) entering a charge or entry to a customer's account; 
(e) correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action with respect to the 
item. 
The West Side Bank court held that subsection (e) of section 4-109 permits a 
payor bank to reverse any action taken with respect to a check so long as the 
time limits established by section 4-213(1)(d) have not yet expired. 39 The 
West Side Bank decision has found little favor with the commentators, who 
point out that section 4-213 seems to assume that the process of posting 
might be completed prior to the expiration of the bank's midnight deadline, 
while under the Wisconsin court's interpretation the process of posting 
would never be completed until the expiration of the section 4-213(1)(d) 
time limits and therefore section 4-213(1)(c) would be superfluous. 40 
In the Raymer case Justice Braucher stated the "[w]e need not and do not 
decide whether we would follow the much discussed decision in West Side 
Bank."41 Although the factual situations involved in Raymer and West Side 
Bank were quite similar, Justice Braucher was quite correct in pointing out 
that rather different legal issues were posed in the two cases. The critical dif-
ference is that the West Side Bank case was an action by the presenting bank 
as holder of the check seeking to recover the amount of the check from the 
without having such right under statute, clearinghouse rule or agreement; or 
(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the 
drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith; or 
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed to revoke the settlement 
in the time and manner permitted by statute, clearinghouse rule or agreement. 
Upon a final payment under subparagraphs (b), (c) or (d) the payor bank shall be accountable 
for the amount of the item. 
" 37 Wis.2d at 672, 155 N.W.2d at 593. 
" /d. at 668-72, 155 N.W.2d at 591-93 . 
.. /d. 
40 See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE§§ 16-4, 17-7 (2d ed. 1980); Malcolm, Reflections on West Side Bank: A Draftman's 
View, 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 23 (1968). 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1877, 424 N.E.2d at 520. 
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payor bank on the theory that the bank had made final payment, while the 
Raymer case was an action by the drawer alleging that the bank's failure to 
pay the checks in question was wrongful, entitling the drawer to damages 
for wrongful dishonor. 
As both the trial court and the Supreme Judicial Court recognized in 
Raymer, section 4-303(1) is the provision of the U.C.C. which governs the 
question of whether a payor bank's contractual obligation to honor proper-
ly payable checks drawn by its customer has been affected by the interposi-
tion of a conflicting claim to the customer's account. Although section 
4-303(1) may not provide a complete priority rule for resolving conflicting 
claims to a customer's account, section 4-303(1) does specify that if certain 
actions have been taken with respect to the payment of a check before the 
interposition of the conflicting claim to the account, then the existence of 
the conflicting claim does not alter the bank's right or duty to pay the 
check. Accordingly, section 4-303 was sufficient to resolve the problem 
presented in Raymer. Since the Court concluded that the bank's exercise of 
its right of set-off came too late under the standards of sectibn 4-303(1}, the 
obligation of the bank to its customer to honor checks properly payable was 
not affected by the set-off, and the bank therefore subjected itself to possi-
ble wrongful dishonor liability to the drawer under sectioh 4-402 when it 
chose to dishonor the checks for which no funds remained after the untime-
ly set-off. 
The issue involved in the West Side Bank case would have been presented 
in the Raymer case had the payees of the checks in question brought suit 
against the payor bank seeking to recover the amount of the checks. The 
conclusion that the set-off came too late under the section 4-303(1) stand-
ards would not, however, have resolved such a dispute. Section 4-303(1) 
would, in such a case, only tell us that the bank's right or duty to honor the 
check had not been affected by the attempted set-off. A payor bank, 
however, has no duty to the holder of a check to honor it .unless the bank 
has accepted it or has become accountable under the provisions of section 
4-213 or 4-302. Thus, in an action by a holder of a check against the payor 
bank, resort must be had to section 4-213(1}, for section 4-303(1) stops short 
of resolving the issue. 42 
42 Professors White and Summers, however, argue that § 4-303 should be regarded as a com-
plete priority provision for resolving conflicts between the holder of a check and a competing 
claim to the accounts and that if the competing claim comes too late under the § 4-303 stand-
ards, then the holder is entitled to payment, without reference to§ 4-213, See WHITE & SuM-
MERS, supra note 40, at§ 17-7. White and Summers provide no explanation of where in the 
language of§ 4-303 they fmd anything concerning the liability of the payor bank to the holder. 
The contrary view, adopted herein, is that developed in Leary & Tarlow, Reflections on Ar-
ticles 3 and 4 for a Review Committee, 48 TEMPLE L.Q. 919, 926-33 (197~). 
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The significance of the analytical distinction between the provinces of 
sections 4-303(1) and 4-213(2) lies in the fact that in one respect the two pro-
visions differ in the specification of the steps which if completed by the 
payor bank render the conflicting claim untimely, in the case of section 
4-303(1), or render the payor bank accountable for the item, in the case of 
section 4-213(1). Section 4-303(1)(d) states that the conflicting claim to the 
account comes too late if the payor bank has 
completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the 
drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith or otherwise has 
evidenced by examination of such indicated account and by action its decision 
to pay the item. 
Section 4-213(1)(c), on the other hand, states that a payor bank becomes ac-
countable for an item if it has 
completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the 
drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith. 
It appears, then, that entirely aside from the thorny problems involved in 
determining when the "process of posting" has been completed, it is quite 
possible for the section 4-303(1)(d) time limit to expire prior to completion 
of the process of posting. 
The comments to section 4-303(l)(d) indicate that the "or otherwise has 
evidenced ... its decision to pay" language was intended to cover banking 
practices such as sight posting in which a bank official makes a specific deci-
sion to pay an item, although the actual mechanical process of posting -in 
the sense of recording the payment -is delayed. 43 For example, in Yandell 
v. White City Amusement Park, Inc., 44 trustee process was served on a 
bank by a creditor of its customer during the period that certain checks were 
being processed, and a dispute ensued over whether the bank had proceeded 
far enough with the process of paying those checks to defeat the levy to the 
extent of the amount of the checks. Due to the troubled financial condition 
of the depositor, its accounts were carefully scrutinized by the bank, and the 
checks in question were shunted out of the usual posting process for in-
dividualized attention by more senior bank officials. 45 Prior to service of 
the trustee process writ, a responsible bank officer had examined the checks 
in question, ascertained the state of the account, and decided to pay the 
checks, evidencing that decision by placing a hold on the account for the 
amount of the checks and stamping them with a special stamp. 46 The actual 
machine posting of the checks was not completed until after the trustee 
process writ was served. 47 On these facts the district court, applying U.C.C. 
•• See U.C.C. § 4-303, comment 3 . 
.. 242 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mass. 1965). 
•• Id. at 583-84. 
•• Id . 
• , Id. at 584. 
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section 4-303(1) as the law of Massachusetts, held that the trustee process 
came too late under the "decision to pay" provision of 4-303(1) to ter-
minate the bank's right to pay the checks. 41 
In explaining why it was not necessary to resolve the West Side Bank issue 
in the Raymer case, Justice Braucher noted that in West Side Bank the 
Wisconsin court did not discuss section 4-303(1) while in Raymer "[i]n 
deciding the present case under § 4-303 the [trial] judge followed the 
analysis indicated in the official comment with respect to the 'decision to 
pay.' " 4' It appears that the Raymer case is to be viewed as resting solely on 
the second clause of section 4-303(1)(d) and the trial judge's finding, which 
the Supreme Judicial Court upheld under the clearly erroneous standard, 
that the bank had "evidenced . . . its decision to pay." 50 Since section 
4-303(1)(d) provides that a set-off comes too late if the payor bank has 
either completed the process of posting or has ''evidenced ... its decision to 
pay the item," the Raymer court's conclusion that the bank had evidenced 
its decision to pay made it unnecessary to consider whetheli the bank had 
also "completed the process of posting." Thus, it was unnecessary to con-
sider the West Side Bank case issue of whether section 4-109(e) permits a 
payor bank to contend that the process of posting cannot be completed until 
expiration of the time limits for the return of the item. 
Whether the Raymer Court's refusal to pass upon the West Side Bank 
issue was proper depends upon whether the Court was correct in ruling that 
the Raymer case could be disposed of on the basis of the "evidenced ... its 
decision to pay" provision of section 4-303(1)(d). The opinion in Raymer 
does not specify what procedures the bank employed in processing the 
checks. The opinion states only that the trial judge's findins that the bank 
had made the decision to pay rested on the finding "that the bank's 'usual 
procedure' involved completion of posting before 6 a.m. on the day follow-
ing receipt of the item. " 51 The commentary to section 4-303 suggests that 
the "decision to pay" language was included in contemplation either of 
older banking practices in which the mechanical steps of recQrding payment 
regularly followed the decisional steps or of situations such as that involved 
in Yandell where a specific judgmental step is made outside of the usual 
routine process of payment. 52 It seems likely that in Raymer the bank was 
following modern practices of completing the mechanical ste(Ps of recording 
the payment first and then proceeding through several routine steps for 
determining whether the check should not be paid and the previously made 
computer entries reversed. Moreover, from the absence in the opinion of 
"/d. at 585. 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1877, 424 N.E.2d at 520. 
•• /d. at 1876, 424 N.E.2d at 519. 
" /d. 
52 See U.C.C. § 4-303, comment 3. 
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any indication that specific judgmental steps were taken, it seems likely that 
no specific, out-of-the-ordinary judgmental step was involved in the proc-
essing of the checks involved in Raymer. If the facts were as here surmised, 
then one might have argued that it makes little sense in such a situation to 
distinguish between ''completion of the process of posting'' - however one 
may finally resolve the problems involved in interpreting that phrase - and 
"evidencing . . . [the] decision to pay the item," since the evidence of the 
bank's decision to pay would simply be the bank's completion of the 
routine steps involved in posting without deciding not to pay the check. If 
that argument were accepted, then the 4-303(1)(d) standard and the 
4-213(1)(c) standard would coincide, except in cases such as Yandell involv-
ing a specific judgmental step, and it would have been far more difficult for 
the Court in Raymer to have avoided the West Side Bank case issue. 
Further consideration of the function of section 4-303(1) suggests, 
however, that whether or not one should in the context of a dispute between 
a payor bank and a holder of the check, as was involved in West Side Bank, 
take into account the distinction between completing the routine process of 
check payment without deciding not to pay and completing a specific 
nonroutine, judgmental process of deciding to pay, there is good reason to 
collapse that distinction in the context of pure section 4-303(1) disputes of 
the sort involved in Raymer. Although the situations covered by section 
4-303(1) involve conflicts between holders of checks and other claimants to 
the account, section 4-303(1) does not specify a complete set of priority 
rules for resolving disputes where it is alleged that the bank chose the wrong 
party. Rather, section 4-303(1) at most tells the bank that if certain steps 
have been completed in the processing of the check then the bank can opt 
for paying the check, ignoring the competing claim, without fear of liability 
to the competing claimant. Section 4-303(1) is, then, more in the nature of a 
safe harbor rule for payor banks which elect to pay checks in disputed situa-
tions than a comprehensive priority rule. Viewing section 4-303(1) in this 
light, it appears that a principal objective of this provision is to provide 
payor banks which wish to proceed with the payment of checks not-
withstanding competing claims to the account with assurance that they may 
safely do so. In light of the strong policies encouraging payment of checks, 
there is much to be said for interpreting 4-303(1) in a fashion that will result 
in protecting the bank's decision to pay at the earliest possible time. Of 
course, in cases such as Raymer where the competing claim is the bank's 
own set-off claim rather than a claim of a third party, the payor bank is 
unlikely to wish to proceed with the payment of the check. Thus, inter-
preting section 4-303(1) as cutting off the competing claim at an early stage 
may increase the payor bank's potential wrongful dishonor liability in cases 
involving set-offs. Section 4-303(1), however, clearly provides that set-offs 
are to be treated in the same fashion as other claims to the depositor's ac-
count. Thus, even though the 4-303(1) rule will appear to payor banks less 
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like a safe harbor than a rocky ledge in cases involving set-offs, that is no 
reason to alter the interpretation of section 4-303(1) favoring payment of 
checks. 
Thus, there is much to be said for reading section 4-303(1)(d) as providing 
that the competing "legal" comes too late as soon as the bank has either 
made a specific, non-routine decision to pay and evidenced that decision by 
some notation in its records, or completed the routine process of check 
processing without coming to a decision not to pay. The Raymer case can 
well be read as supporting such a reading. On the other hand, in the context 
of disputes of the sort involved in West Side Bank between the holder of the 
check and the payor bank, the equities may well be different. As Professor 
Leary points out, such disputes are often appropriately categorized as situa-
tions in which the holder seeks a windfall at the expense of the bank's 
stockholders. 53 Therefore, the Raymer Court's resolution of the section 
4-303(1) issue in favor of cutting off the "legal" at the earliest possible date 
should not pre-judge the Court's resolution of the West Side Bank issue if 
and when that question reaches the Court. 
The Raymer Court's resolution of the issues involving damages seems en-
tirely proper on the facts presented. Although a number of controversial 
issues concerning the measure of damages in wrongful dishonor cases may 
have been involved in the case, the Court's discussion of the damage issues 
was rather brief, such that it is unlikely that the Court will regard the case as 
a dispositive precedent should the issues arise again and be considered more 
fully. 
The Court's reversal of the trial judge's award of damages in the face 
amount of the checks was clearly appropriate. The wrongful dishonor cause 
of action, whether classified as sounding in tort or contract, is in the nature 
of a defamation action for the injuries which may flow from what will ap-
pear to the holders of the checks in question, and to others who hear about 
it, as an assertion that the drawer is issuing bad checks. Damage to business 
reputation and credit standing are the central concerns. As the action has 
nothing to do with liabilities on the instruments in question, awarding the 
drawer the face amount of the checks as damages is wholly unsupportable. 
On this point, some explanation may be warranted of the Raymer Court's 
suggestion that "in some circumstances such an award may be appropriate 
under UCC § 4-402. " 54 The cases cited by the Court in support of this prop-
osition were ones in which checks were dishonored as a result of a substan-
tively wrongful set-off- as, for example, cases in which a bank sets off 
against customer's account a debt of another party or an alleged debt which 
was not due." In such cases the depositor is entitled to the entire account 
" See Leary & Tarlow, supra note 42. 
,. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1877, 424 N.E.2d at 520. 
" American Fletcher Nat'l Bank v. Flick, 146 Ind. App. 122, 252 N,E.2d 839 (1969); 
38
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1981 [1981], Art. 4
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1981/iss1/4
§ 1.4 CONTRACTS AND COMMERCIAL LAW 39 
balance, undiminished by the set-off, and accordingly can recover the 
amount of the set-off - not the amount of the dishonored checks - from 
the bank. This, in fact, was the measure of recovery in the cases cited by the 
Court. 56 Such recovery is more accurately considered as simply an action by 
the depositor to recover the Bank's debt to him represented by the account, 
undiminished by the set-off, rather than a wrongful dishonor action. 
The plaintiff in Raymer did, however, also seek more appropriate 
damages, alleging that the wrongful dishonor had caused damage to the 
business of the company. 57 The trial judge, however, ruled against the 
plaintiff on the factual question of whether any harm to the business had 
been traced sufficiently to the wrongful dishonor, and the Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed this finding as not clearly erroneous. 58 The Court further 
ruled that in the absence of such proof, the plaintiff was entitled only to 
nominal damages. This ruling does involve several issues of interpretation 
of section 4-402 which provides that 
A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately caused by the 
wrongful dishonor of an item. When the dishonor occurs through mistake, 
liability is limited to actual damages proved. If so proximately caused and pro-
ved damages may include damages for an arrest or prosecution of the 
customer or other consequential damages. Whether any consequential 
damages are proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor is a question of fact 
to be determined in each case. 
Justice Braucher noted that the comment to this provision indicates that 
this section was intended to reject the pre-Code rule that a business whose 
checks were wrongfully dishonored could recover substantial damages even 
without specific proof of any injury. 59 Commentators generally have sug-
gested that the wording of the second sentence warrants the conclusion that 
this so-called "trader rule" is preserved in cases where the dishonor oc-
curred other than through mistake, and therefore that substantial damages 
may be awarded even without proof of actual injury in cases of intentional 
dishonor. 60 
In the Raymer case Justice Braucher states that "(t]he present case is not 
one of mistake, and we think it proper ... to order the entry of judgment 
for nominal damages." 61 Since the plaintiff in Raymer was suing on an as-
Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966). A third case cited by 
the Court in Raymer, Joler v. Depositors Trust Co., 309 A.2d 871 (Me. 1973), did not actually 
present the issue. 
" American F1etcher Nat'l Bank v. F1ick, 146 Ind. App. 122, 124-28, 130-31, 252 N.E.2d 
839, 840-43, 844 (1969); Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 739-40, 745, 418 
P.2d 191, 194, 198 (1966). 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1878, 424 N.E.2d at 520. 
" /d. 
" /d. 
60 E.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CoDE§ 17-4 (2d ed. 1980). 
61 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1878, 424 N.E.2d at 520. 
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signed claim of a business, it would seem that under the interpretation of 
section 4-402 urged by the commentators, the determination that the dis-
honor was not a result of mistake could authorize the award of substantial, 
rather than merely nominal, damages. Whether the Court meant to exclude 
the possibility of awarding substantial damages is unclear from the opinion, 
so it appears that on this issue, as on the difficult problems involving the in-
terpretation of section 4-109 and 4-213, we shall have to await further deci-
sions by the Court. It is much to be regretted that the Court shall no longer 
have Justice Braucher's assistance on such matters. The Rayn,er case, hand-
ed down less than three weeks before Justice Braucher's death on August 
26, 1982, was his last opinion on matters of commercial law. His presence 
will be greatly missed. 
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